The discussion on Balochistan sourced to its mention in the joint statement at Sharm el Sheikh and a concession to Pakistan was the first ever of its kind. Unfortunately it boomeranged on Pakistan despite the categorical assertions about Indian involvement in destabilising Balochistan, including training of 600 Baluch dissidents in Afghanistan.
A Baloch participant traced the history of grievances, insurgency and alienation which had made Balochistan ripe for another Bangladesh. The demand for independent Balochistan was created by Islamabad’s wrong policies and bad governance and also lack of development.
While the assassination in 2006 of Nawab Akbar Bugti became the turning point in the insurgency and alienation, forced disappearances and torture in military custody drove the last nail in the coffin. Excesses by security forces and the dominant role of the Quetta Corps Commander have militarised governance.
The narration of the Baloch tragedy was a major embarrassment for the Pakistanis who, for strategic balance, demanded a discussion on the Maoist civil war in India. The first political and economic package for Balochistan was presented in a historic joint session of Parliament in Islamabad on the very day the topic was discussed at the conference.
Balochistan will not allow gas pipelines through its territory as it has been deprived of its share of revenues from its provincial resources of copper, gas and gold. Royalties for gas came only in 1991 whereas the gas went commercial in 1951, Baloch leaders say, and want the Federal government to pay the province the arrears it is owed.
It is the same story – although the Pakistani delegation did not agree – with Gilgit-Baltistan, (previously called Northern Areas) the Shia part of Azad Kashmir which has ethnic and linguistic connections with Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh and has been under the control of Pakistan for 63 years.
The strategic location of Gilgit-Baltistan – which is sandwiched between China, Central Asia, Afghanistan and India – makes it crucial for Pakistan to prolong its ‘occupation’ of the region. The year 2009 saw more sectarian killings than the previous two years put together.
When you consider how Baltistan is governed, you are struck by the time warp. Even today Baltistan is neither a part of Pakistan nor an autonomous region or an independent country. The region is ruled through legal framework orders and presidential ordinances and a recently announced empowerment order is yet another ordinance without a constitutional cover.
This package is a prelude to the Governor’s rule and will only strengthen Pakistani colonialism since the Pakistani Prime Minister and the Governor will have a veto to any laws passed by the Legislative Assembly. However, the delegates from Pakistan objected strongly to these assertions.
But notwithstanding objections on Gilgit-Baltistan, the Pakistani side showed amazing flexibility on Kashmir. Kashmir, a Pakistani said, was no longer a high priority issue in Pakistan after Gen Pervez Musharraf. But there was consensus that a settlement could be reached on Kashmir.
The four-point Kashmir formula, which was even endorsed by Hizb ul Mujahideen supremo Syed Salahuddin as the ‘first step’, has such wide acceptance among political parties in J&K that the PDP had made it the basis for its autonomy document. It was agreed that a historic opportunity was missed in 2006 to clinch the Kashmir issue.
The session on India-Pakistan relations began with a Pakistani painting two scenarios – the removal of President Zardari and the formation of a national unity government; and President Zardari staying but deprived of the powers under the 17th Amendment. The erstwhile troika was redundant as the Army Chief, Gen Kayani, was calling the shots after the Army resurrected its image post-Lal Masjid.
The new players in what was described as New Pakistan were a fiercely independent media, a strong judiciary and a vibrant civil society. There was also mention that the Pak Army had said ‘tauba’ (enough) and so had the ISI to dirty tricks. That the ISI had bitten off more than it could chew was the broad interpretation though some Pakistanis did not believe the Army and the ISI were on the mend.
There was a consensus that the joint anti-terror mechanism was not of good design and would not work in its present form. The ISI and R&AW have to engage each other and get the Indian military intelligence also involved. One Pakistani suggested changing the framework for dialogue without mentioning specifics but insisted that some outstanding issues like Siachen, Sir Creek and Wullar barrage were ripe for settlement.
Pakistanis were convinced that India would not resume the composite dialogue till action was taken against the culprits of Mumbai. It was said that when even Gen Pervez Musharraf could not discipline Hafiz Saeed, how could a weak civilian government? Pakistanis want to move beyond Mumbai, even Kashmir, focussing on defusing the proxy wars in Afghanistan and Balochistan and discussing the vital waters issue.
For breaking the impasse over the dialogue, Indian generosity was sought and the ‘ball is in India’s court’, it was said. Not so, was the Indian retort. Whenever Pakistan runs out of good Taliban, it invokes India’s generosity: big brother/bigger country and land (Kashmir) for peace deal.
They were told that India had been extravagant in its generosity (and tolerance) in the face of ceaseless cross-border terrorism even after several Pakistani pledges not to allow the use of its soil for the same.
Now that it is reasonably clear that the Western troops will pull out of Afghanistan sooner than later, what should India and Pakistan prepare themselves for in a post-US Afghanistan? The feeling was that a greater South Asia, that includes China, Myanmar, Iran, Afghanistan should be attempted – Pakistanis said this is a reality that India should learn to live with. They noted with some satisfaction that the rise of China and the decline of the US inevitably meant an eclipse of India.
In the circumstances, there had to be a difference in the way India and Pakistan look at Kashmir. That this was already happening was clear. But this change should be reflected in the conversations Indians and Pakistanis were having on a variety of subjects. For instance, the ISI and Indian intelligence have had some contact. The Mumbai crisis was handled quite deftly, with restraint. It was, after all the Pakistani news channels that said Ajmal Kasab was a Pakistani.
The sense was that 2005-06 the best period for India-Pakistan relations. No breakthroughs were expected in 2010 but no major Pakistan initiative should be expected because Pakistan was bogged down in problems of its own. The bracing news from the Pakistani delegates was that there was no constituency in Pakistan that sought conflict with India any more. But India needed to be bighearted.
It was agreed that terrorism, Afghanistan, Balochistan and water issues constituted the priority list – Kashmir was an afterthought – and pending revival of composite dialogue, the back channel could be reactivated. Media jingoism and the war of words had to be stopped. Summing up the mood, a Pakistani had the last word: ‘If we cannot be best of friends, let us be good friends’.
Source: The Tribune, Chandigarh, India.
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